The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis by Shaffer, Michael J.
THE PROBLEM OF NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT
CONDITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
MICHAEL J. SHAFFER
Abstract: In this article the standard philosophical method involving intuition-
driven conceptual analysis is challenged in a new way. This orthodox approach to
philosophy takes analysanda to be the specifications of the content of concepts in
the form of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Here it is argued that there
is no adequate account of what necessary and sufficient conditions are. So, the
targets of applications of the standard philosophical method so understood are not
sufficiently well understood for this method to be dependable.
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One prominent account of the methods of philosophy is that philosophy
is intuition-driven conceptual analysis. In fact, according to a significant
number of philosophers, such conceptual analysis is the only method of
philosophy. For the purposes at hand, this account of the methods of
philosophy will be referred to as the standard philosophical method (SPM).
This methodological account of philosophy can be more completely char-
acterized as follows:
(1) Conceptual analyses take the form of proposed definitions (that is,
sets of necessary and sufficient conditions) or analysanda.
(2) The adequacy of any anaysandum can be tested against concrete
and/or imagined cases.
(3) Whether or not a proposed analysandum is adequate or not with
respect to a given case can be determined by the use of a priori
intuition, and a priori intuition is a distinct, reliable, and fallible
non-sensory mental faculty.
(4) Intuition allows us to reliably access knowledge about concepts.
(5) The method of reflective equilibrium is the particular method by
which intuitions can be used to confirm/disconfirm analysanda.1
1 Recent defenses of SPM include Jackson 1998, Bealer 1996, and McGinn 2012. For
closely related views see Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009. Shaffer forthcoming includes
extensive discussion of this view.
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According to the defenders of SPM, this is essentially the method of
philosophy in a nutshell, and it has been assumed to be adequate for the
solution of philosophical problems by a significant number of both prac-
ticing and prominent philosophers throughout the history of philosophy.
For example, this is essentially the contention made by Colin McGinn in
his recent book Truth by Analysis (2012). McGinn is not in the least bit
tentative in his blanket defense of SPM as the one and only method of
philosophy. With this aim in mind, early in the book he makes the fol-
lowing extended declaration about philosophy: “[I]t is not a species of
empirical enquiry, and it is not methodologically comparable to the
natural sciences (though it is comparable to the formal sciences). It
seeks the discovery of essences. It operates ‘from the armchair’: that is,
by unaided (usually solitary) contemplation. Its only experiments are
thought-experiments, and its data are possibilities (or ‘intuitions’ about
possibilities). Thus philosophy seeks a priori knowledge of objective
being—of non-linguistic and non-conceptual reality. We are investigat-
ing being as such, but we do so using only a priori methods” (McGinn
2012, 4).
As should be immediately apparent, this is a clear, straightforward, and
ringing endorsement of SPM as it has been explicated here. To buttress
this contention we need only take note of McGinn’s other claims that “the
proper method for uncovering the essence of things is precisely conceptual
analysis” (2012, 4) and that “philosophy, correctly conceived, simply is
conceptual analysis” (2012, 11). McGinn explains that conceptual analy-
ses then take the form of specifications of the content of a pre-theoretical
concept (the analysans) by the articulation of sets of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions (the analysandum). In effect, he believes that we arrive at
such analyses by considering possible cases and asking ourselves whether
the concept applies or does not apply in those cases—that is by consulting
our “intuitions” about such cases (2012, 7). What is also important for the
purposes at hand is his acknowledgment that this account of philosophical
methodology “was really the standard conception for most of the history
of the subject, in one form or another” (2012, 7). So, not only does
McGinn endorse SPM as the sole methodology of contemporary philoso-
phy, he also claims that it is the enduring methodology of philosophical
inquiry throughout its history.2
One important thing that needs to be clarified about McGinn’s version
of SPM concerns the nature of the object of analysis (the analysans) and,
more important, the nature of the analysandum itself as they are typically
understood (that is, as definitions of a particular sort). Carl Hempel
usefully makes a crucial distinction in this regard that we can use to
illuminate the standard view of such definitions as follows: “The word
2 See McGinn 2012, 4–11, for a summary identification of significant historical examples
of the use of SPM, including some of those already discussed here in more detail.
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‘definition’ has come to be used in several different senses. . . . A real
definition is conceived of as a statement of the ‘essential characteristics’ of
some entity, as when man is defined as a rational animal or a chair as a
separate moveable seat for one person. A nominal definition, on the
other hand, is a convention which merely introduces an alternative—and
usually abbreviated—notation for a given linguistic expression, in the
manner of a stipulation” (Hempel 1952, 2). Moreover, in discussing one
proposed definition of a living organism offered by Hutchinson, Hempel
tells us further that some real definitions are to be understood as follows:
“The expression on the right-hand of (3.2) [that is, the left component of
the relevant bi-conditional, Dx & Mx & Rx] might be claimed to be
synonymous with the phrase ‘x is a living organism’ [i.e., Lx]. In this case,
the ‘real’ definition (3.2) purports to characterize the meaning of the term
‘living organism’; it constitutes what we shall call ameaning analysis, or an
analytic definition, of that term (or, in an alternative locution, of the
concept of a living organism). Its validation requires solely a reflection
upon the meanings of its constituent expressions and no empirical inves-
tigation of the characteristics of living organisms” (1952, 8).3
This is, of course, precisely what McGinn has in mind with respect to
conceptual analysis. It is then worth making the obvious point that con-
ceptual analysis is the operation of analyzing concepts via proposing defi-
nitions, but to point that out is not enough to fully grasp the view. It is true
that SPM is a method that takes as inputs our concepts, but it involves the
recognition that the definitions involved are to be understood as meaning
analyses rather than some other kind of real definitions. Hempel explains
the distinction between these types of definition as follows: “On the other
hand, the ‘real’ definition (3.2) might be intended to assert, not that the
phrase ‘x is a living organism’ has the same meaning as the expression on
the right [of the bi-conditional], but rather that, as a matter of empirical
fact, the three conditions D, M, and R are satisfied simultaneously by
those and only those objects which are also living things. The sentence
(3.2) would then be an empirical law, and its validation would require
reference to empirical evidence concerning the characteristics of those
beings. In this case, (3.2) represents what we shall call an empirical analysis
of the property of being a living organism” (1952, 8). Hempel continues
and makes the following crucial point about empirical analysis as distinct
from meaning analysis: “Empirical analysis and meaning analysis differ
from each other and from nominal definition. Empirical analysis is con-
cerned not with linguistic expressions and their meaning but with empiri-
cal phenomena: it states characteristics which are, as a matter of empirical
3 My bracketed notes added. Definition (3.2) has the form Lx ≡ Dx&Mx& Rx. HereDx
means “x is a kind of discrete mass that interacts with its environment,” Mx means “x is a
metabolic entity of a particular sort,” and Rx means “x is an entity that reproduces in a
specific manner.” See Hempel 1952, 7, for more details.
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fact, both necessary and sufficient for the realization of the phenomena
under analysis. . . . Empirical analysis in terms of general laws is a special
case of scientific explanation” (1952, 8–9).
Hempel contrasts this account of empirical analysis with meaning
analysis as follows: “Nominal definition and meaning analysis, on the
other hand, deal with the meanings of linguistic expressions. But whereas
a nominal definition introduces a “new” expression and gives it meaning
by stipulation, an analytic definition is concerned with an expression
which is already in use—let us call it the analysandum expression or,
briefly, the analysandum—and makes its meaning explicit by providing a
synonymous expression, the analysans, which of course has to be previ-
ously understood” (1952, 9). So, for example, the question of whether
knowledge is justified true belief is just the question of the analysis of the
concept of knowledge in terms of definitions constituted by sets of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions understood as a meaning analysis. Concep-
tual analysis is then a method of doing something with concepts that we
already possess—wherever they have ultimately come from. It is defining a
pre-theoretical concept by offering a synonymous expression. It then
appears to be the case that the defenders of SPM must believe that con-
cepts have the forms of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, that
such analyses are meaning analyses and that analyses of our pre-analytic
concepts are informative. Typical analysanda are thus kinds of decompo-
sitions of pre-analytic concepts. They are conceptual truths with the forms
of analytic definitions.
Of course, this view is not at all unique to McGinn; many others share
this view of conceptual analysis. For example, Robert Audi offers the
following like-minded characterization of conceptual analysis: “Let us
simply construe it as an attempt to provide an illuminating set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for the (correct) application of a concept, where
an illuminating set is roughly one which brings out the content or structure
of the concept in such a way as to clarify the concept and indicate its
relation to at least some other concepts, most typically those representing
its constituents” (Audi 1983, 90).4 So—for McGinn and other like-minded
thinkers—one might think that an analysandum will have the following
very simple logical form (where n is finite): (Cx ≡ {D1x, D2x, D3x, . . . ,
Dnx}). This is supposed then to tell us the true nature or essence of objects
of type Cx in terms of a finite set of defining essential features. So,
providing such an analysis involves decomposing the analysans into a list
of features, thus exposing—in some important sense—the content of the
concept. In this article this view will be challenged, but in a new manner.
Many recent critics have attacked SPM in terms of points (2) to (5) listed
above by challenging the bona fides of the faculty of intuition. This is the
4 See also Hansson 2006, White 1975, Jackson 1998, and Braddon-Mitchell and Nola
2009.
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main line of criticism against SPM offered by many defenders of experi-
mental philosophy. Some critics, however, have attacked (1) as well on the
basis of the theory of concepts it assumes, but these sorts of criticisms have
been less in vogue recently.5 Here a new attack on (1) will be mounted. The
gist of the criticism is that SPM wrongly assumes that we possess an
adequate understanding of the concepts of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions. This criticism stems from the truth of a particular theorem of
classical logic.
To this end, the following formula is a, perhaps little appreciated,
theorem of classical propositional logic (CPL):
(T) (p → q) ∨ (q → p).
The following simple indirect proof establishes that this is the case:
1. ¬[(p → q) ∨ (q → p)]. Assumption.
2. ¬(p → q) & ¬(q → p). De Morgan’s Theorem, 1.
3. ¬¬(p & ¬q) & ¬¬(q & ¬p). Def. Material Implication (twice), 2.
4. (p & ¬q) & (q & ¬p). Double Negation (twice), 3.
5. (p & ¬q). Simplification, 3.
6. (q & ¬p). Simplification, 3.
7. p. Simplification, 5.
8. ¬p. Simplification, 6.
9. (p & ¬p). Conjunction, 7 and 8.
10. ¬¬[(p → q) ∨ (q → p)]. Indirect Proof, 1–9.
11. (p → q) ∨ (q → p). Double Negation, 10.
This proof seems to be totally unobjectionable in CPL. However, consider
the following two canonical definitions, where S(p, q) means “p is a
sufficient condition for q” and N(q, p) means “q is a necessary condition
for p”:
(D1) (p → q) ≡ S(p, q).
(D2) (p → q) ≡ N(q, p).
D1 and D2 are then supposed to be the standard (that is, canonical)
interpretations of our ordinary language concepts of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions in CPL.6 D1, D2, and T trivially imply then the following
statement:
5 See, e.g., Moore 1968 (1942) and Wittgenstein 1953. Moore’s paradox of analysis
appears to show that such analyses are uninformative, andWittgenstein claims that concepts
have the form of family resemblances rather than sets of necessary and sufficient conditions.
6 See, e.g., Copi, Cohen, and Flage 2007, 196, 449, and 446, and Fisher 2001, 241.
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(S1) [S(p, q) & N(q, p)] ∨ [S(q, p) & N(p, q)].
As T is a theorem and D1 and D2 are definitions in CPL, this should hold
for all p and q. Consider the following two true English statements:
(E) Earth is a planet.
(N) Electrons have a negative charge.
We know that neither of the following statements is true:
(S2) Earth’s being a planet is a sufficient condition for electrons’
having a negative charge, and electrons’ having a negative charge
is a necessary condition for Earth’s being a planet.
(S3) Electrons’ having a negative charge is a sufficient condition for
Earth’s being a planet, and Earth’s being a planet is a necessary
condition for electrons’ having a negative charge.
Both S2 and S3 are known to be false as a matter of our background
knowledge of the facts involved, and so the disjunction S2 ∨ S3 is false.
Thus, S1 is false according to our background knowledge. It does not hold
for some pairs of statements. But, the set {D1, D2, T} implies that S1 is
true. So, when E and N are substituted into S1 we get a contradiction (and
there will be arbitrarily many such contradictions generated for each pair
of true sentences that are unrelated in the way that E and N are). So, the
set {D1, D2, T} formally constitutes a paradox.
As Olin (2003) points out, the basic nature of a paradox is that it
involves a set of propositions Λ each of which is prima facie reasonable to
endorse, but where (in the context of background knowledge Σ) the set Λ
appears to imply a contradiction. So paradoxes are essentially sets of
propositions which appear to be individually rationally endorsable but
which cannot collectively be endorsed. This can be because the set Λ is
itself internally inconsistent or because Λ appears to imply some proposi-
tion p and Σ implies ¬p. Let us refer to a given set Λi as the paradox
constituting propositions of paradox i. We can then also present paradoxes
as deductive arguments where the members λ1, λ2, . . . , λn of a given set Λ
are the premises and where they either appear to directly imply (p & ¬p)
or where Λ appears to imply p and Σ implies ¬p. So in this case {D1, D2,
T} is a paradox with respect to Σ because Σ implies ¬S1, whereas {D1, D2,
T} implies S1. S1 is supposed to be true for all p and q, but we know that
this is not the case. As a result, something has gone wrong, and in order to
resolve the paradox something has to be given up.7 The proof of T seems
unobjectionable, however, and so thereby does T. The falsity of both S2
and S3 that grounds the denial of S1 also seems unobjectionable. Some
7 See Rescher 2001 and Olin 2003 for discussion of paradox resolution.
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pairs of propositions just do not satisfy S1. This leaves only D1 and D2 as
the culprits, and it seems to be the case that the canonical concepts of
necessary and sufficient conditions are incorrect.
We appear then to need to replace the canonical definitions of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions with some stronger conceptions that do
not fall prey to this problem. The immediately obvious suggestion is the
idea that there is some modal content in the notion of necessary and
sufficient conditions that is left out in D1 and D2, and this suggestion is
the one that McGinn and other defenders of SPM appear as if they would
endorse. McGinn himself asserts that “modality is central to philosophical
investigation—as is definition. The natural and mathematical sciences
may also be in the business of discovering essences (chemistry, geometry),
but they are not concerned, as sciences, with the modality of what they
discover” (2014, 4). George Bealer also endorses this form of SPM whole-
heartedly and supports the same sort of view when he claims that “the
central questions of philosophy—and their answers—are phrased in quite
general terms without any mention of particular individuals, species, and
so forth. These questions are necessary in the sense that they call for
answers that hold necessarily. In being interested in such things as the
nature of mind, intelligence, the virtues, and life, philosophers do not want
to know what these things just happen to be, but rather what those things
must be, what they are in a strong sense” (Bealer 1998, 203–4).8
Given this sort of view, analysanda would have the following generic
form (where n is finite): □(Cx ≡ {D1x, D2x, D3x, . . . , Dnx}). As a result,
one could replace D1 and D2 with the following “modalized” definitions
of necessary and sufficient conditions:
(D1′) □(p → q) ≡ S(p, q).
(D2′) □(p → q) ≡ N(q, p).
This substitution appears to resolve the paradox constructed above, but it
does so only at the price of introducing an equally unpalatable problem.
This is the case because D1′ and D2′ give rise to the following objection-
able kinds of cases. Let p be any set of contradictory sentences and q an
arbitrary proposition. According to D1′ and D2′, p will be a sufficient
condition for q and q will be a necessary condition for p. This is because
of the infamous principle of CPL known as ex contradictione (sequitur)
quodlibet. It is another surprising theorem of classical logic, and its proof
is quite simple:
1. (p & ¬p). Assumption.
2. p. Conjunction elimination, 1.
3. ¬p. Conjunction elimination, 1.
4. p ∨ q. Disjunction introduction, 2.
8 See Bealer 1998, 201–40, and Bealer 1996, 121–42.
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5. q. Disjunctive syllogism, 3, 4.
∴ (p & ¬p) → q. Conditional proof, 1–5.
Of course, this generalizes for any q whatsoever, and so every contradic-
tion validly implies every proposition in the context of CPL. This effec-
tively means that if we substitute D1′ for D1 and D2′ for D2 (in order to
avoid the paradox introduced earlier), the defenders of this version of
SPM are committed to the view that at every possible world for every q, q
has every contradiction as a sufficient condition and q is a necessary
condition for every contradiction. This is obviously unacceptable, and so
this most obvious attempt to avoid the paradox noted above fails. It
appears to be the case that D1′ and D2′ are equally problematic. So,
ultimately, it is not at all clear how exactly we are supposed to define
necessary and sufficient conditions, and this is a serious problem for SPM.
One might be tempted to appeal to the concept of analyticity, but as
should be apparent to everyone at this juncture, any such appeal is bound
to be at best controversial in light of the well-known problems with that
concept.9 Another possible suggestion is to replace the material condi-
tional in D1 and D2 (or in their modalized counterparts) with some form
of relevant implication, but that concept is also deeply controversial.10
It is not, however, the purpose of this article to resolve this issue; but
the fact that we lack an adequate account of necessary and sufficient
conditions is a serious and pressing matter once we recognize that the very
concept of intensional definition is at stake here, in addition to the more
specific recognition that the account of the nature of the targets of con-
ceptual analysis assumes is problematic. This is because the more funda-
mental canonical account of an intensional definition on which (1) is based
is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and both the standard
account of necessary and sufficient conditions and its modalized relative
are inadequate for the reasons raised here.
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